This paper analyzes the fault tolerance of a class of double-loop networks referred to as forwardloop backward-hop FLBH, in which each node is connected via unidirectional links to the node one hop in front of it and to the node S hops in back of it for some S. A new measure of fault tolerance is described, along with techniques based on Markov c hains to calculate upper and lower bounds on the fault tolerance of this network topology quickly and e ciently. The results of these calculations provide a more precise description of network fault tolerance than has been achieved with previously published techniques.
Introduction
Loop-or ring-based topologies have become increasingly important for local and metropolitan area networks. Loops support simple and e cient protocols. Their symmetry reduces the diversity o f hardware components needed, and their use of unidirectional point-to-point links allows e cient ber implementations. Many network architectures have been designed with loop-based topologies, 1 including the 802.5 token ring, the Fiber Distributed Data Interface FDDI network, the Distributed Queue Dual Bus DQDB with redundancy, and the Synchronous Optical Network SONET ring. One great liability of the simple loop is that any single failure disrupts communication. As a result, there has been considerable research i n to methods of enhancing the fault tolerance of a loop network, where fault tolerance is some measure of the likelihood that connectivity among nodes is maintained despite failures. Liu et al. 2 proposed the Distributed Double Loop Computer Network DDLCN which consists of two counter-rotating loops. FDDI, DQDB, and SONET are examples of a pair of counter-rotating loops. This topology can tolerate any single failure and a few multiple failures without any loss of connectivity. V arious algorithms and protocols can be used to perform recon guration that will make use of redundant paths in a DDLCN. 3, 4 , 5 To further improve fault tolerance, topologies consisting of a loop with some redundant links have also been explored. 6, 7, 8 One of these loop topologies is the forward-loop backward-hop FLBH double-loop network, in which a node has outgoing links to the nodes one forward" and S backward" for some S. 9, 10, 11, 1 2 , 13, 14, 15 T h us, if the nodes of an N-node network are numbered from 0 to N , 1, node i has outgoing links to node i , 1 In order to design a network that meets the fault tolerance requirements of its intended application, it is necessary to de ne a measure of fault tolerance appropriate for that particular application, and to assess the measure for various network con gurations. Considering that failures may be described by some probabilistic model, in order to calculate the most appropriate measure for any application, it would be necessary to determine the joint probability distributions that node i is accessible to node j for all combinations of i and j. The only method known to determine these joint distributions is complete enumeration, which is only tractable in very small networks. It is therefore necessary to select a measure which corresponds to a network's ability to maintain connectivity for a wide range of applications, and which can be calculated for large networks. The measure of network fault tolerance chosen in this paper is f, the mean fraction of nodes accessible to a node, given that the latter is up. f = E number of nodes accessible to a functioning source =N , 1 For applications in which it is important t o e v aluate the probability of maintaining connectivity between particular nodes, the probability Pk that node k is accessible from a given functioning node is also considered. Without loss of generality, this given node the source is de ned to be node 0 throughout the paper. The measure f can be expressed in terms of Pk as follows. Fault tolerance of FLBH networks must be measured across the expected range of N for each v alue of S under consideration. A network designer can then determine whether any FLBH network can meet the intended application's requirements, and if so, a value of S can be selected that yields the desired tradeo between fault tolerance and other design objectives, such as throughput and ease of recon guration. 25 Section 2 presents the fault tolerance measures and calculation techniques used in previous studies of FLBH networks. In the following section, a new approach to calculating the fault tolerance measure f is presented. Finally, results for several sample networks are presented in Section 4, as is the computer time required to achieve these results.
Related Work
There have been several previous e orts to determine the fault tolerance of FLBH networks. Raghavendra et al. 8, 9 , 1 2 use two measures which re ect aspects of fault tolerance, but which do not correspond directly to the probability of maintaining connectivity. They de ne distance from a source to a destination as the minimum number of hops that must be traversed to get from the source to the destination. The rst of their measures is the diameter of the network, i.e., the largest distance across all possible source-destination pairs. This gives some indication of how reliable paths are, since longer paths generally tend to decrease fault tolerance. The second measure is the number of minimum-length paths for a source-destination pair separated by a distance equal to the diameter of the network. This measure gives some indication of the number of alternate paths in the network, where a large number of alternate paths generally tends to increase fault tolerance.
They optimize both their measures of fault tolerance with respect to S, and they conclude that the FLBH network where S is approximately p N is optimum for both measures, as well as for delay and throughput characteristics 8, 9, 12 , although it has since been shown that the network diameter is not always minimized when S = p N. 26, 27 These measures are easy to calculate and provide some insight i n to the fault tolerance of FLBH networks, but they have o b vious limitations. The minimum-length paths are not disjoint, so the measure of alternate paths does not re ect the fact that a single failure could block many paths. There are also many alternate paths that are not minimum length, and the impact of these is not considered in either measure. Also, the only paths considered are those between a source and destination that are separated by a distance equal to the diameter of the network, which m a y indicate little about the fault tolerance across other source-destination pairs.
In the case where S = 2 the daisy chain, Grnarov et al. 16 found a technique to evaluate a more direct measure of fault tolerance. They determined the probability that one node is accessible to another in the presence of failures given both are up the terminal reliability for each possible pair of nodes. They assumed failures were independent. The algorithm used 28 requires the enumeration of all possible paths from source to destination. The cut-sets are determined using Boolean algebra manipulations of variables representing the links and nodes in each path. Unfortunately, this technique does not extend well to FLBH networks with S 2 because the number of alternate paths is far greater. Ibe 17 calculates a comparable measure of performance for some special cases of FLBH networks. He compares the reliability of single-loop networks with station bypass, double-loop networks with S = 1 the simple DDLCN, and double-loop networks with S = N , 2. The latter is a braided network" 18 , as used in 19 . Links are assumed to be reliable, but nodes can fail. When S = 1 o r S = N , 2, node i is inaccessible to node i + j if and only if one or two consecutive nodes between i and i + j have failed, respectively. This greatly simpli es analysis, but the approach cannot be applied to other values of S.
In papers by Masuyama 29 and by Masuyama and Ichimori 30 , the tolerance to node failures but not link failures of FLBH networks with arbitrary S was evaluated by determining, for each possible set of node failures, the exact number of node pairs i; j such that i can send a message to j. This is done by e n umerating all possible patterns of node failures, where a pattern is de ned by the distance between failures, and then counting the communicating source-destination pairs for each pattern. Assuming failures are independent and identically distributed throughout the network, it is then possible to determine the probability that a randomly chosen source can send a message to a randomly chosen destination, given the number of failures that have occurred. They dealt with double and triple node failures explicitly and conjectured results for larger numbers of failures. The primary problem with this approach is that it is extremely di cult to enumerate all possible sets of failures and determine the resulting number of communicating source-destinations pairs. In these two papers, the factor used to di erentiate failure patterns is whether failures occur S+1 nodes apart. Except when S = N=2, they claim that all functioning nodes can communicate unless there is at least one pair of failures that occur S + 1 nodes apart. While this is the case for double failures if S 6 = 1, it is incorrect for three or more failures. There are many failure patterns other than failures occurring S +1 apart that can reduce the connectivity of a network, such as the triple-failure case shown in Figure 2 . Since their conjecture about networks with more than three failures is based on the same premise, it is also incorrect. See 31 for a more detailed critique of this approach. Smith and Trivedi 32 also evaluate the fault tolerance of FLBH networks using an approach based on enumeration of fault sets. However, their measure of fault tolerance is di erent: the expected length of time before it is no longer possible for all N nodes to communicate with each other, given that all nodes and links were initially up. The time before link failure is assumed to be independent and exponentially distributed with identical mean for all links. The value of this measure is easier to calculate by e n umeration than is the measure used by Masuyama and Ichimori, because it is su cient t o c haracterize failure sets that reduce the number of communicating nodes without determining the extent of this reduction. Since any node failure makes it impossible for all N nodes to communicate, this is only a useful measure by which to compare network topologies if nodes are considered to be reliable. For the case Smith and Trivedi consider in which N = S 2 and thus N must be a perfect square, they are able to prove some properties about the link failure sets that disrupt communication. They then enumerate the failure sets with these properties. They were able to do this exactly for N = 4 and N = 9, but for N 9 the large number of failure sets forced them to settle for upper and lower bounds. If they were to broaden their inquiry to include values of S 6 = p N using the same approach, then, for a given N, they would get the same upper and lower bounds on fault tolerance for all S. T h us, even when using a measure of fault tolerance that is relatively simple to calculate by e n umeration, and only considering link failures, the utility of enumerative techniques is limited.
The primary di culty with methods based on the enumeration of failure sets or the enumeration of paths is the cardinality of the sets to be enumerated. In a network of N nodes, there are a total of 3N elements nodes and links that can fail, so there are 8 N failure sets. The number of loop-free paths also goes up rapidly with N for S 2. Since enumeration is only tractable for very small networks, a technique is needed to calculate some useful measure of fault tolerance that is not based on enumeration. Hu and Hwang 33 successfully avoided enumeration through their choice of a measure for fault tolerance: the probability that there exists some nodes i and j such that node i is functioning, node j is functioning, and node i cannot transmit to node j. Although they did not calculate fault tolerance with this measure, they sought the value of S that would minimize it. Nodes can fail with equal and independent probabilities, and links are assumed to be reliable. They were able to solve this problem if and only if N is even, in which case they conclude that S should equal N=2 , 1. This result is apparent from the following observations. First, since we are only concerned with the probability that two functioning nodes will not be able to communicate and not the extent t o which communications will be disrupted, double node failures will dominate cases of more than two failures. Second, as Masuyama observed, such a communications failure can only occur with two node failures if those failures are S + 1 apart. 29, 30 There are N node pairs that are S + 1 apart, unless N is even and S = N=2 , 1, in which case there are N=2 such node pairs. Consequently, this measure of fault tolerance is optimized when S = N=2 , 1. The problem is that the impact o f a t wo-node disruption is far more severe in the special case where S = N=2 , 1. In this case, a functioning node will, on average, nd less than half of the other functioning nodes accessible.
With any other choice of S between 1 and N , 1 except N 2, one functioning node would lose the ability to transmit, one would lose the ability to receive, and all other communications would be una ected. With this measure of fault tolerance, we w ould consider such a scenario a network failure, whereas the case of 4 node failures would not be a network failure unless it happened to interfere with communications. As an example, let a disruptive double-node failure occur when N = 100. With S 6 = N=2 , 1, a functioning node would nd 95.3 of the other 97 functioning nodes accessible on average. With S = N=2 , 1, it would nd 48 accessible on average. The poor fault tolerance achieved with S = N=2 , 1 when the extent of failure is considered will be demonstrated in the gures in Section 4. Moreover, S = N=2,1 has adverse e ects on throughput, delay 9, 10, 1 1 , 12, 13, 14, 2 4 , and recon gurability 25 , so there is incentive to nd an approach that estimates fault tolerance with smaller values of S.
Analysis
In this section, we calculate upper and lower bounds on the fault tolerance of FLBH networks given the following.
R N = the probability a node is up. R S = the probability a short link is up. R L = the probability a long link is up. N = the number of nodes in the network. S = the skip distance.
As described in Section 1, fault tolerance is measured as follows. Pk = the probability that node k is accessible to node 0. f = the expected fraction of nodes that are accessible to a given functioning node.
Approach
Without loss of generality, w e can assume that a node is accessible to the source only if there is a loop-free path from the source to that node, because the existence of a path that is not loop-free implies the existence of one that is. Consequently, one type of path that need not be considered in this analysis is one in which a long hop is followed or preceded by S or more short hops. All remaining paths take one of two forms: paths consisting entirely of short links and paths with at least one long link and no more than S , 1 consecutive short links. Since it is simple to determine the probability that the one path to a given node containing only short links is up, we will initially concentrate on the paths containing at least one long link. Loop-free paths containing long links have t wo c haracteristics that can be used to simplify analysis. First, a path from node 0 to node k must include at least one node from any block o f S consecutive nodes along the way. This means the path includes at least one node in the range from node i , S + 1 modulus N to node i for all i : 0 i k. Second, the nal hops before reaching the destination node consist of a long hop followed by 0 t o S , 1 short hops. Thus, a path cannot extend more than S ,1 nodes beyond the destination unless it traverses the entire loop and approaches the destination once again from the direction of the source. This only occurs in multiple cycle paths, where the number of cycles is de ned as follows. Letting distance d = Snumber of long hops,number of short hops, there are dd=Ne cycles in a path. See Figure 3 for an example o f a t wo cycle path. When this does occur, by the rst property of these paths discussed above, a path that traverses the entire network must include at least one of any S consecutive nodes in the network. Assume that one could somehow determine whether or not some set of S consecutive nodes are accessible to the source. If one also knew whether all of the nodes from these S consecutive nodes to the node S , 1 past the destination were up, as well as the status of their associated links, it would be possible to determine whether or not the destination was accessible to the source. In particular, since the source is always accessible to itself, if one knew the accessibility of the nodes 2 f N , S + 1 ; N, S + 2 ; : : : ; N, 1g, and whether the nodes 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; k + S , 1g and their associated links were up, it would be possible to determine whether k was accessible to the source. The status of the nodes 2 f k + S ; : : : ; N, Sg would be irrelevant. Given these properties, it is possible to de ne a node-indexed Markov process, the state of which contains information pertaining to the accessibility o f S consecutive nodes. Let Z 0 b e a v ector of S elements which denotes the accessibility from the source of the nodes 2 f N ,S + 1 ; N ,S + 2 ; : : : ; N ,1; 0g. If a node is accessible to the source, then the corresponding element is assigned an O; otherwise it is assigned an X. For i : 0 i N , let Z i also be a vector of S elements which indicates the accessibility of the nodes 2 f i,S +1modN ; : : : ; i g, using paths with some restrictions; Z i is de ned from Z 0 and the state of the nodes 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; i g and their associated links as follows. Let k be a node 2 f i , S + 1modN ; : : : ; i g. I f n o d e k is up, and there exists a node j 2 f N , S ; : : : ; N, 1; 0g such that j is accessible to the source, and there exists a path from j to k that includes no nodes 2 f i + 1 ; i + 2 ; : : : ; N, Sg, then the element i n Z i corresponding to node k is assigned an O. If node k is up, and it is accessible to node i via short links, but there does not exist a node j 2 f N , S ; : : : ; N, 1; 0g such that j is accessible to the source, and there exists a path from j to k that includes no nodes 2 f i + 1 ; i + 2 ; : : : ; N , Sg, then the element corresponding to node k is assigned an &. Otherwise, an X is assigned. An O indicates that node k is de nitely accessible to the source, and an X indicates that node k is de nitely not accessible to the source. An & indicates that node k is accessible if and only if node i is accessible, a fact that cannot be ascertained based only on Z 0 and the status of the nodes 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; i g, because the only possible paths to node i go through node i + 1. Note that in the special case where i = 0, because i is by de nition accessible to the source, the de nition of Z i reduces to the de nition given for Z 0 .
It is possible to determine Z i from Z i,1 and the status of node i, the link from node i to node i , 1, and the link from node i , S modulus N to node i. T h us, assuming the status of this node and links is known, the process Z i is Markovian and deterministic. If node i is down, it is marked with an X. If it is up, node i , S is accessible to the source, and the link from node i , S is up, then node i is marked with an O. Otherwise, it is marked with an &. The accessibility o f a node 2 f i , S + 1 ; : : : ; i , 1g must be the same in Z i as in Z i,1 unless it was marked with an &. In this case, if node i is accessible from the source and the link from node i to node i , 1 is up, it is marked with an O. On the other hand, if node i is inaccessible marked X, or the link from node i to node i , 1 i s d o wn, then it should be marked with an X. Otherwise, the label remains &. Note that in Z i , no node marked with either an X or an O can be preceded by a node marked with an &. As a result, the cardinality of the state space is 2 S+1 , 1 rather than 3 S .
For a given failure set, the process Z can be used to determine which nodes are accessible even if the accessibility of the nodes 2 f N , S + 1 ; : : : ; N, 1g are not initially known. In this deterministic case, Pk is 0 or 1 for all k. The procedure will now be described, followed by an example. Let to node 1 will be included, i.e. Z 3 1 = O XO, whereas Z 3 0 = X X O. In the non-deterministic case in which each node and link is considered up with some given a priori probability, one way to nd Pk i s t o e n umerate all possible failure sets and their probability distribution, use the above procedure to determine accessibilities, and then to calculate the average Pk. However, this would constitute an enumerative method, and not the most e cient one. The speed of this calculation could be improved if it were possible to work with all of the failure sets simultaneously. Computational complexity w ould be reduced from ON8 N t o O N.
One might conceive of an approach t o a c hieve this as follows. Z 0 is found in distribution. A method is found of calculating the distribution of Z i+1 from the distribution of Z i . Z is then a node-indexed discrete-time Markov process. The transition probability from Z i to Z i+1 clearly depends on the probability that node i + 1 and some attached links are up, i.e. R N , R L , and R S . Section 3.2 and 3.3 will demonstrate how an approach such as this can be used to get upper and lower bounds on fault tolerance. However, this approach cannot be used to derive the desired results exactly, for the following reasons. Since the accessibility of the nodes 2 f N , S + 1 ; : : : ; N, 1g depends on the status of links and nodes throughout the network, there is a correlation between Z 0 and the probability that any link or node is up. Consequently, given Z 0 or the distribution of Z 0 , the a posteriori probability that any link or node is up does not equal the known a priori probability. These probabilities are the basis of the transition probabilities of the stochastic process.
Consequently, the stochastic Markov process Z cannot be said to exactly correspond to a physical quantity. Moreover, the distribution of Z 0 is not known in the rst place. These complications make an exact calculation of Pk using the stochastic process Z impractical. Sections 3.2 and 3.3
show that it is possible to make certain simplifying assumptions that allow us to calculate lower and upper bounds for Pk, respectively, i n O N using the stochastic Markov process Z.
Lower Bound
A l o wer bound on Pk can be found by restricting possible source-destination paths to exclude some possible paths. As previously described, paths can have u p t o S cycles. Since there are few failure sets that block all single-cycle paths without blocking multiple-cycle paths as well, a good lower bound for Pk can be achieved by determining the probability that a node is accessible from the source using only single-cycle paths with long links or paths consisting entirely of short links. In single-cycle paths, the only way a path can include a long link out of a node 2 f N ,S+1; : : : ; N ,1g is if the path goes from the source to that node using only short links. The probability that such a path can go through any of these S , 1 nodes does not depend on the status of node i or any o f i t s links for all i 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; N ,Sg. T h us, if only single-cycle paths are considered, a distribution can be found for Z 0 that is independent of the up-down status of nodes 2 f 1; : : : ; N, Sg and their associated links. The special case where the destination is one of the nodes 2 f N ,S+1; : : : ; N ,1g requires a minor variation which will be described later in this section. Thus, Z is a Markovian stochastic process and its transition probabilities are based on the a priori probabilities of link and node failure. Letb denote the distribution of Z 0 . F or this lower bound, the probability that Z 0 is in a given state is simply the joint probability that the nodes 2 f N , S + 1 ; : : : ; N, 1g can be accessed with paths containing only short links, which is easy to calculate. As N grows large with respect to S, the probability that multicycle paths exist decreases, and this lower bound approaches the exact solution.
The single step transition probabilities from Z i,1 to Z i are a function of the probability that node i is up, the probability that the link from node i to node i , 1 is up, and the probability that the link from node i , S + 1 modulus N to node i is up. Figure 4 shows the entire state transition probability matrix, A, for S=2. R N is the probability that a node is up; R S is the probability that a short link is up; R L is the probability that a long link is up. For this matrix it is assumed that failures are independent and identically distributed. If failures are not identically distributed, Z is a non-homogeneous process, and A depends on the current node, i. Dependent failures can only be accommodated with this approach if the dependence can be accounted for in the transition matrix. For example, perhaps the fact that node i , 1 failed makes it more likely that node i also failed. In this case, the probability of node failure would be higher when Z k has an X in its last component.
As long as the S , 1 nodes before the source and the S , 1 nodes after the destination do not overlap, i.e., k N ,2S + 1, the distribution of Z i is simplybA i . F or k in this range, we n o w use this fact to derive Pk. We will subsequently return to the case where k N ,2S+1. To determine whether node k is accessible, it is necessary to examine the state of the nodes 2 f k ; : : : ; k + S , 1g, since some paths to node k must go from k , 1 t o k + S , 1 When k N , 2S , 1, the calculation of Pk m ust account for the fact that the S , 1 nodes before the source overlap the S , 1 nodes after the destination. A node that is both one of the S , 1 before the source and one of the S , 1 after the destination is said to be in the overlap.
A path may include a node in the overlap in one of two w ays: either near the source, in which case it is accessible from the source using only short links, or near the destination, in which case the destination is accessible to the node using only short links. For a particular failure set, if the only paths from source to destination containing long links include a given node both near the source and near the destination, then the only loop-free path is the one containing only short links. This destination should be considered inaccessible using paths with long links, or else the failure set will be counted twice in Pk. The nodes between the source and the destination in the direction of the short links are divided into two groups: those that are allowed to be near the source in source-destination paths considered in this calculation, and those that can be near the destination. An equal break to the extent possible produces the most accurate results. For example, if node 0 is, as usual, the source, and node N , 3 is the destination, then there are two nodes to divide. Node N , 2 can only be used near the destination, and N , 1 only near the source. In this case, node N , 2 is considered inaccessible near the source, and node N , 1 is considered inaccessible near the destination.
A n o d e j is made inaccessible before the source by making the probability that Z 0 is in a state in which n o d e j is accessible equal to 0. Letb N,j;X be the appropriate vector derived fromb accordingly. F or all the states in which n o d e j is accessible, the corresponding element i ñ b N,j;X is 0. For the other states, the element i ñb N,j;X is the same as in cb, where c is chosen so that the elements ofb N,j;X sum to 1. Letb N,j;XO be the initial state vector derived fromb by forcing to 0 not only states in which n o d e j is accessible but also the states in which the nodes 2 f j + 1 ; j + 2 ; : : : ; N ,1g are not accessible. This vector is used to calculate the probability that a node is inaccessible from the source with paths that contain long links, but is accessible through the path with only short links. To ignore paths using some of the nodes after the destination, rather In summary, a l o wer bound on Pk is calculated as follows. The transition matrix A is determined from R N , R L , and R S . The distributionb of Z 0 is found from R N and R S based on the assumption that the nodes 2 f N , S +1 , . . . , N , 1g are only accessible if they are accessible via the path of short links. Pk is calculated for k N , 2S , 1 using Equation 3. Otherwise, Pk is calculated using Equation 4.
Upper Bound
As with the lower bound previously discussed, the correlation between the probability that nodes and links are up and the distribution of Z 0 must be eliminated. This correlation is caused by multicycle paths. To a c hieve an upper bound, we m ust calculate Pk i n a w ay that includes all failure sets in which a path from source to destination exists, and possibly some where no such path exists. A necessary but insu cient condition for a node's accessibility is that the node must be up, and at least one incoming link must be as well. Thus, a simple upper bound can be achieved by assuming that there is a path to a node 2 f N , S + 1 ; : : : ; N, 1g that is up and has at least one functioning incoming node. Theb corresponding to this assumption is easy to calculate. Moreover, since there is no correlation between the up and down status of any t wo network elements, there is no correlation between the Z 0 resulting from this assumption concerning accessibility and the transition probabilities of the stochastic process. As with the lower bound, Z i is therefore Markovian with transition probabilities that are based on a priori probabilities of node and link failure.
It is possible to improve the upper bound by using a di erent method for calculatingb. Recall the deterministic case in which w e determined the accessibility of all nodes by beginning with a Z 0 in which only the source was up, and using it iteratively to nd more accurate Z 0 's. In S iterations, we had exact results. This process can also be done probabilistically rather than deterministically, using the transition matrix A, to nd a distribution for Z 0 . After the rst iteration, the distributionb would indicate the accessibility of the nodes described in Z 0 via single cycle paths that begin with long links and via paths containing only short links. However, in the second cycle,b would not describe accessibility via one and two cycle paths in the manner of the deterministic case.b at this point is based on some failure sets in which a given node or link is up in the rst cycle or iteration and down in the second cycle, and vice versa. Consider such a failure set where the up-down status of link or node j changes from the rst cycle to the second while we are trying to determine whether or not node N , 1 is accessible. If element j was down in the rst cycle, the resulting accessibility o f n o d e N ,1 can only be improved compared with the case where j's status does not change. If j was up in the rst cycle, but was not needed in order to nd a path to node N , 1, then its status in this cycle was irrelevant, and a change in its status from one iteration to the next would not matter. Finally, i f j was up in the rst iteration and was needed to nd a path to N , 1, then nothing is lost by precluding its use in subsequent iterations, since to do so would cause a loop in the path. Thus, assuming independence of the up-down probabilities in di erent iterations will result in an upper bound for Pk. Let To complete the analysis, Pk m ust be determined for k N , 2S , 1. There are two cases: k N , S and k N , S. F or k N , S, the only problem with the above equation is that the S , 1 nodes before the source and the S , 1 nodes after the destination overlap. Consider the case where the overlap contains exactly one node. The paths from source to destination that begin with S , 1 consecutive short links will go through this node, as will the paths that end with S , 1 consecutive short links. To consider this node as two di erent nodes, one before the source and the other after the destination, produces an upper bound. It is never true that a path must go through the node in both places, since such a path would include a loop. If the only loop-free path to the destination for a particular failure pattern is the path containing only short links, and a path does exist that traverses the entire network and includes a node in the overlap twice, then this failure pattern would be counted twice in our basic equation for Pk: once for the path with the loop and once for the path without it.
For the upper bound, it is therefore acceptable to assume that link and node status near the source is independent of that near the destination when calculating the probability that a node is accessible by a path using long links. However, independence cannot be assumed in the second half of the equation which calculates the probability that a node is accessible using only short links but inaccessible using paths containing long links. Thus, for this part of the equation, the state of Z should not be considered at Z k+S,1 . Instead, the S , 1 nodes before the source are simply excluded from the nal state of Z in the same manner we excluded some nodes in the overlap when calculating the lower bound. 
Results
In order to evaluate our calculated bounds on fault tolerance, we wish to compare them with exact values for f. These values are found by e n umerating all possible failure sets. For a given failure set, we use a recursive ooding routine which w orks as follows. When the routine is called on node i, i t declares i accessible. It then examines the two outgoing links from node i and the two associated nodes. If an outgoing link is up, the associated node j is up, and node j is not presently declared accessible, the routine is called on node j. The program begins with no nodes marked accessible by calling the routine on the source. By determining which nodes are accessible for each failure set, as well as the probability that each failure set occurs, the average number of accessible nodes f can be found. Figure 5 shows the fault tolerance f of an 8-node network with R N =.9, R S =.97, and R L =.93, as a function of S. All failures are assumed to be independent. Both upper bounds, the lower bound, and the exact value of f are shown. For S 4, the lower bound is close to the exact solution, more so than the upper bound. The simpler upper bound seems to perform almost as well as the eigenvector-based method, so the improved accuracy of the eigenvector-based method may often not be worth the computation time. The lower and upper bounds are always exactly correct for S = 1. This is because the initial vector Z 0 contains only one element which indicates the accessibility of the source node. This node is always accessible by de nition, which means that the distributionb is known with certainty and the a priori and a posteriori probabilities of failure are equal for all network elements. As S increases, the accuracy of both bounds tends to decrease. This is because, for both upper and lower bounds, approximations are used for the accessibility of the S , 1 nodes before the source, and for the 2S , 1 destination nodes for which there are nodes in the overlap. As S increases, so do the e ects of these approximations. The lower bound is also generally more accurate than the upper bound; the inaccuracies in the estimated f caused by ignoring multiple cycle paths are not as great as those caused by assuming some paths exist simply because the destination node and one incoming link are up. This is useful since in practice, it is the lower bound that typically must be guaranteed.
The accuracy of f is especially poor for S N = 2, since this overlap problem occurs with every node in the network. If desired, this easily can be remedied by altering the analysis slightly. A backward hop of S is the same as a forward hop of N , S. I f S N = 2, then Z 0 should be an N , S element v ector, each element of which indicates the accessibility to the source of the nodes j 2 f 0; 1; : : : ; N , S ,1g, i.e., the N , S nodes in the positive direction from the source as opposed to the S nodes in negative direction. Single step state transitions would go in the direction that we h a ve de ned as negative, i.e., Z i would be a function of the status of node i and its associated links and Z i+1 , as opposed to Z i,1 . The rest of the analysis would proceed analogously. F rom the gure, it is clear that the shape of the curve for the exact solution is roughly symmetric with respect to S = N=2, although fault tolerance is slightly better for S = N=2 , j than S = N=2 + j where 0 j N = 2. The evaluation of fault tolerance for networks with S N=2 is generally less important, since network performance throughput and delay in this region has been shown to be inferior, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1 2 , 1 3 , 14 and fault tolerance is expected to be as well. 8, 9 , 1 2
An evaluation of the accuracy of the upper and lower bounds would be more meaningful in a network with more than eight nodes. Unfortunately, it is di cult to get an exact solution for larger networks, since an exact calculation of fault tolerance for a network with only nine nodes and potential link and node failures takes about 36 hours of computation on the Sun 3 80 workstations used for this research. To allow the exact calculation of f in a larger network, reliable links are used, thereby reducing the number of elements that can fail from 3N to N. Figure 6 shows results for a 20-node network with node failures but no link failures. Even with S = N=2 , 1, both the upper and lower bound are accurate to within less than 4. From the exact curve, it is also clear that N = S=2 , 1 = 9 is not optimal with respect to this measure as Hu and Hwang found 33 ; fault tolerance is better with any v alue of S from 3 to 8. In addition, there is little di erence between the two upper bounds, indicating that the simpler to calculate would probably su ce in this example. Figure 7 shows the lower and upper bounds on a larger network of 50 nodes with unreliable links as well as nodes. This example shows how fault tolerance increases very quickly with S when S is small, and then plateaus. For the 50-node network, although the lower bound of f peaks at S = 6 , a n y v alue of S such that 4 S 9 w ould produce roughly the same results. Figure 8 shows the upper and lower bounds of Pk for the 50-node network with S = 6 . Except for the nodes 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; S , 1g, the variation of Pk is relatively small, which is a useful characteristic of the network. It means that there are no node pairs for which communication is particularly unreliable relative to the rest of the network, so it is generally not necessary to consider fault tolerance when determining the placement of particular nodes within the network.
The primary exception are the nodes 2 f 1; 2; : : : ; S , 1g, but the extent of this e ect is di cult to evaluate because this is also the region where the lower and upper bounds di er the most. This is because the fact that the lower bound only accounts for single cycle paths has the most impact here. For example, there is only one single cycle path from node 0 to node 1, the one consisting of S , 1 short links followed by a long link. However, there are likely to be many m ultiple cycle paths, since the path ends on the rst node of the second cycle. The low fault tolerance of the lower bound in this region also produces damped waves of increasing and decreasing fault tolerance with period S. The other area where the lower and upper bounds di er signi cantly is near node N , S where approximations were necessary to accommodate the overlap between the S , 1 nodes before the source and the S , 1 nodes after the destination. Let us now consider a practical example in which i t m ust be determined in a reasonable length of time which v alues of S lead to a level of fault tolerance that the network designer considers adequate. Since networks are not typically redesigned every time a node is added or removed, we will assume that some minimum fault tolerance must be guaranteed over a given range. Let N vary from 100 to 125, with R N =.9, R S =.97, and R L =.93. Failures are independent. In Figure 9 , the smallest lower bound in this range of N is shown for every S between 1 and 12. It appears that the best selection of S in terms of f would be 7 or 8, but any v alue of S from 6 to 10 would yield roughly the same fault tolerance. Using the methods of Raghavendra et al., 8, 9 , 1 2 one would predict that the best value of S is 10 or 11. This is close, but judging from Figure 9 , setting S to 11 would signi cantly reduce fault tolerance. Although this is only a lower bound, and thus does not actually prove that f is signi cantly lower for S = 11, the accuracy of the lower bound generally seems to be too good to account for all of the drop in f shown in Figure 9 . N. The complexity of computing bounds is exponential with respect to S, because the cardinality of the matrices is exponential with respect to S. H o wever, in Figure 10 , the rate of exponential increase is only about 2.15, presumably because of the inherent sparsity of the matrices which also goes up with S. F or comparison, an exact calculation of fault tolerance for a single, 7-node network with given S took over 40 minutes, and computation for an 8-node network took almost four and a half hours. Times for exact computation should go up at a rate of approximately 8 N . Under this assumption, an exact numerical computation of f in a single 125-node network with given S would take about 10 102 years. Therefore, nding an exact measure of f or Pk is not feasible in many typical FLBH networks, but bounds can be calculated for most practical networks in a tolerable amount of time. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we h a ve presented an e cient method of calculating upper and lower bounds on fault tolerance in forward-loop backward-hop FLBH networks. It enables us to evaluate networks much larger than would be possible through enumeration, and with a direct and meaningful measure of fault tolerance. With the lower bound on fault tolerance, a network designer can determine whether an FLBH network is guaranteed to meet fault tolerance speci cations, and if so, with what values of S. In the examples considered here, we found the optimal value of S, based on our lower bound on fault tolerance, to be much smaller than N=2 , 1 as proposed in 33 , and slightly smaller than p N as proposed in 8, 9 , 1 2 W e also found that, in large networks, fault tolerance is close to optimal for a wide range of values for S.
